Mind and Deity Book

MIND AND DEITY Being the Second Series of a Course of Gifford Lectures on the General Subject of METAPHYSICS AND THEISM given in the University of Glasgow in i 4Q by JOHN LAIRD LL. D-, F. B. A. Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY PUBLISHERS 15 EAST FORTIETH STREET NEW YORK, N. Y. FIRST PUBLISHED IN 194 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN in iz-Point Founder Type BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED WOKING Preface THIS second series of lectures is meant to be the complement of the first, and indeed to be complement rather than sequel True, I have made a few references to the first series in the present volume, and at the end of it I have said something about the mutual relations of the two series. Substantially, however, any reader of this book who had never heard of the first series would not be handicapped in any significant way. He might find the beginning of die second series indefensibly abrupt That, I allow, would be due, in part at least, to the fact that there was a first series, which series, indeed, began in appropriately leisured fashion. But, in my judgement, awkward little things like that are incidental and not substantial. If I have failed in some such way, the cause is my own artlessness and is not interknit with my theme. I should like, once again, to thank my friends in Glasgow, and among them my patient and very faithful audience, for all the encouragement they have so generously given me. I could not be more grateful had I deserved their kindness. If I helped some of them to forget the war for a brief space, I should permit myself to feel a certain tempered satisfaction J-L. KINGS COLLEGE OLD ABERDEEN November, Contents LECTURE PAGE Preface 7 Synopsis of the Discussions 1 1 I. The Ontological Argument 29 II. The Nature of Mind 57 in. The Implications of Idealism 86 IV. Omniscience 114 v. Divine Personality 143 VI. Providence 1 73 VII. Value and Existence 202 VIII. The Moral Proofs of Theism 229 Appendix to Lecture VIII Ut puto deus fid 257 IX. Pantheism 266 X. Concluding Reflections 294 Index of Proper Names 321 SYNOPSIS OF THE DISCUSSIONS I. The Ontological Argument THE earlier lectures in this second course attempt to reconsider the provisional realism of the cosmological first course, and so may help to remove preconceptions that might hinder an equitable discussion of such themes as Gods providence and personality. The celebrated Ontological Argument is a natural bridge between the first course and the second. It was regarded, from Anselm to Descartes and Leibniz, as a straightforward piece of realistic logic. After Kant had refuted the realistic argument, Hegel transformed it into an idealistic assertion, and Hegels assertion is still accepted in principle by several eminent contemporary or near-contemporary philosophers. The realistic Argument to the general effect that perfection would be imperfect if non-existent had a chequered career between the eleventh and the eighteenth centuries. Even at its zenith with Des cartes and Leibniz in the seventeenth century it is doubtful whether, e. g., Spinoza and Malebranche relied very strongly upon it, Male branche preferring the simple assertion of the priority of the infinite to the finite. In Kants refutation of the realistic form of the Argument what was most original and most effective was his perception that the predicate exists in the statement God exists has a status alto gether different from the status of such a predicate as, say, omni potent in the statement God is omnipotent. The second can be denied in two ways, either because there is no God or because there is a God who is not omnipotent. The first can be denied in one way only, i. e. by the denial that there is a God. In short, Kant perceived not only that there was something wrong with the realistic Onto logical Argument but also what was wrong with it...Read More